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The Procedural Relationship Between Truth in
Lending Disclosure Claims and Creditor Contract
Claims
Sara Elwood Cook*
Kasey W. Kincaid**
INTRODUCTION

The Truth in Lending Act,' with accompanying implemental
regulations, 2 is designed to provide uniform methods for the disclosure of credit terms by lenders. This affords consumers an opportunity to make informed choices in the selection of credit.8 The
Act represents a congressional response to the public need for the
fair and honest appraisal of actual costs of using the funds of
another.4
In order to secure creditor compliance with its many disclosure
* Law Clerk, Justice Mark McCormick of the Supreme Court of Iowa. B.A., 1975 University of Iowa; J.D., 1980, Loyola University of Chicago. This article is the product of research
conducted by the author when she served as law clerk to Justice McCormick. It is therefore
necessary to note that nothing in this article is intended to represent the views of Justice
McCormick or the Iowa Supreme Court.
** Law Clerk, Justice Robert G. Allbee of the Supreme Court of Iowa. B.A., 1977, Wartburg College; J.D., 1980, Drake University. This article is the product of research conducted
by the author when he served as law clerk to Justice Allbee. It is therefore necessary to note
that nothing in this article is intended to represent the views of Justice Allbee or the Iowa
Supreme Court.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Truth in Lending Act).
2. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1974).
3. The section of the Truth in Lending Act that delineates the congressional findings
and declaration of purpose provides in pertinent part:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the
extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card
practices.
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1968). See also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 559
(1980); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363-69 (1973).
4. Mourning v. Family Publications Services, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363-69 (1973).
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requirements, the Truth in Lending Act incorporates a criminal
penalty,5 as well as administrative 6 and private civil enforcement
provisions.7 A significant role is envisioned for the private Truth in
Lending litigant in effectuating the purposes of the Act.8 Specifically, the consumer litigant assumes the role of a private attorney
general in the enforcement of the disclosure requirements.9 Certain
problems have arisen, however, with respect to the procedural relationship between Truth in Lending claims and creditor contract
claims. The characterization of these claims, both as counterclaims
and defenses, conceivably deters the potential prophylactic effect
of private enforcement suits, particularly with respect to class
actions.
This article will describe the role of the private litigant in Truth
in Lending Act enforcement and the elements of a private cause of
action. Secondly, the specific substantive questions raised by the
procedural characterization problem will be examined. The majority and minority positions of the federal counts on this issue will
be analyzed. The analysis will demonstrate that uniform resolution
of this procedural issue in the federal courts is critical to the private attorney general concept underlying effective enforcement of
the Truth in Lending Act. Finally, the discussion will focus on the
anomalous Truth in Lending defense cognizable in Illinois which
can operate to foreclose the effective enforcement of a creditor's
contract claim.
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT

The Consumer as a Private Attorney General
The role of the consumer-plaintiff as a private attorney general
is of paramount importance under the Truth in Lending Act in
effectuating creditor compliance. No independent federal agency
was created to enforce the Act.10 More importantly, none of the
existing agencies which possess joint responsibility for administrative enforcement of the Act were granted enforcement powers
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1968).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1968).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1968).
8. See text accompanying notes 10 through 18 infra.
9. The consumer's role as a "private attorney general" has been noted frequently. See,
e.g., Shields v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D. 442, 446 (D. Ariz. 1972); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1968); see, e.g., Buford v. American Finance Co., 333 F. Supp.
1243, 1248 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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greater than what they had prior to the Act." Finally the Act's
criminal sanctions are applicable to only a narrow class of cases,"
and involve inherent difficulties in proof.'3 Thus, the limited nature of the administrative and criminal enforcement mechanisms
clearly elevates the role of the private consumer litigant in enforcement of the Act.
The importance of private litigation is also evident in the context of the class action. While not originally contemplated by Congress, consumer class actions predicated upon purported truth in
lending disclosure violations soon became commonplace. 14 Federal
courts, however, began to refuse to grant class certification in
many truth in lending actions due in part to concern over the potential for disproportionate liability of a creditor in a class action
award.' 5 In confronting this situation, Congress tried to balance
the potential for disproportionate liability against the positive deterrent effect and the resultant incentive for creditor compliance
associated with the threat of class action liability."0 A compromise 1 7 was enacted which placed an upper limit on the total

11. Id
12. Criminal actions and penalties are limited to situations involving "willful and knowing" violations of the Act. In pertinent part the Act provides:
Whoever willfully and knowingly
(1) gives false or inaccurate information or fails to provide information which
he is required to disclose under the provisions of this subchapter or any regulation
issued thereunder,
(2) uses any chart or table authorized by the Board under section 1606 of this
title in such a manner as to consistently understate the annual percentage rate
determined under section 1606(a)(1)(A) of this title, or
(3) otherwise fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1968).
13. See Buford v. American Finance Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1248 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
14. For a discussion of the problems created by the Truth in Lending class action prior
to the 1974 congressional amendments, see Comment, The Truth In Lending Class Action,
40 Albany L. Rev. 753 (1976); Note, Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 83 Yale
L.J. 1410 (1974).
15. E.g., Mathews v. Book-Of-The-Month Club, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 479, 479-80 (N.D. Cal.
1974); Linn v. Target Stores, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 469, 472-75 (D. Minn. 1973); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Kroll v. Cities Service Oil Co., 352 F.
Supp. 357, 360 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D.
412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
16. This is demonstrated by the legislative history underlying the 1974 congressional
amendments to the Truth in Lending Act. See S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1973).
17. Id. at 14-15. See also Annual Report To Congress On Truth In Lending For The
Year 1972, S. 914, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 119 CONG. Rac. 4596 (1973). This com-
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amount of recovery in a truth in lending class action. 18 This action
demonstrates congressional recognition and reaffirmation of the
significant function private litigation plays as a means of achieving
creditor compliance with the terms of the Act.
Key Issues and Elements Relevant to a Truth in Lending
Enforcement Action
The Truth in Lending Act requires creditors to comply with all
disclosure requirements mandated by the Act and the regulations
promulgated thereunder. 19 The Federal Reserve Board is specifically empowered to prescribe regulations to carry out the Act's primary objective of full and fair disclosure of credit terms.20 Pursuant to this directive, the Board has promulgated a massive
collection of regulations, generally known as "Regulation Z," which
specifically delineate the language and format required for proper
credit disclosure under the Act."
Standing to bring suit under the Truth in Lending Act is automatically conferred upon any consumer who is exposed to a disclopromise operated to preserve the Truth in Lending class action's enforcement effectiveness
as well as to prevent lender exposure to unwarranted claims and unlimited liability.
18. See S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973). This compromise is also reflected
in the amended civil liability provision of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1974) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976)). See note 39 infra.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1631 (1968).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 provides:
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the
purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to
facilitate compliance therewith.
See Ford Motor Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
The Supreme Court has recognized the deference to be accorded the Federal Reserve
Board in implementing and interpreting the statutory regulatory truth in lending scheme.
Congress therefore delegated expansive authority to the Federal Reserve Board to
elaborate and expand the legal framework governing commerce in credit ....
[The] traditional acquiescence in administrative expertise is particularly apt
under TILA, because the Federal Reserve Board has played a pivotal role in "setting [the statutory] machinery in motion.. ." (citations omitted) Congress delegated broad administrative lawmaking power to the Federal Reserve Board when
it framed TILA [the Truth in Lending Act]. The Act is best construed by those
who gave it substance in promulgating regulations thereunder.
Ford Motor Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560, 566 (1980). See Bissette v. Colonial Mortgage Corp., 477 F. 2d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("The Board has broad power to implement the Act, power delegated to it by a Congress which was uncertain as to the refinements
potentially required to implement successfully its novel statutory scheme.")
21. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-.1002.
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sure violation, so long as he is an obligor on the contract. 22 Moreover, because standardized terminology is regarded as a
prerequisite to enlightened comparative credit shopping, 3 there is
no standing requirement of deception,2 reliance" or misunderstanding sl on the part of a plaintiff. In short, a plaintiff is not required to sustain any damage, 7 or to actually make a misinformed
credit choice. 8 Instead, the law presumes that violations of the Act
have injured the consumer by frustrating the full and fair disclosure objective. "
The individual plaintiff or plaintiff-class has a minimal burden
of proof in establishing a Truth in Lending violation. Because the
Act is intended to be liberally construed, 80 lenders are required to
adhere precisely to the law and particularly to Regulation Z."1 All

22. White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 540 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1976). The court
noted that although Congress cannot "confer jurisdiction on an Article III court to render
advisory opinions," Congress can create statutory rights unknown to the common law. See
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). In the Truth in Lending context, the consumer-debtor has the right to specific credit information. Failure to provide that information entitles him to bring suit. White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 540 F.2d 645, 649 (4th
Cir. 1976).
The law enables multiple obligors to file suit on the same credit instrument and individually recover. For example, a husband and wife who sign as joint obligors would both be able
to sue and each could individually recover the statutory penalty. The legislative history
reveals that Congress requires only one disclosure statement for joint obligors simply to
reduce paperwork. "For example, if two people (e.g. husband and wife) are the obligors only
one copy. . . would need to be furnished." H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 1962, 1984. There is no indication
that Congress intended to limit the liability of each lender to a single obligor. Smith v. No. 2
Galesburg Crown Finance Corp., 615 F.2d 407, 416 (7th Cir. 1980); Mirabel v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1976); Allen v. Beneficial Finance Co.,
531 F.2d 797, 805-06 (7th Cir. 1976).
23. See McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1978); Pennino v. Morris
Kirschman and Co., 526 F.2d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Smith v. Chapman, 614
F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980).
24. Dzadovsky v. Lyons Ford Sales, Inc., 593 F.2d 538, 539 (3d Cir. 1979).
25. Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980).
26. Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980); McGowan v. King, Inc., 569
F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1978); White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 540 F.2d 645, 649-50 (4th
Cir. 1976).
27. McGowan v. King, Inc. 569 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1978); Hinkle v. Rock Springs
Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1976); White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 540
F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1975); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp.
270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
28. Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980).
29. Dzadovsky v. Lyons Ford Sales, Inc., 593 F.2d 538, 539 (3d Cir. 1979).
30. Williams v. Public Finance Corp., 598 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1979); Hannon v. Security
Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1976).
31. Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Finance Corp., 615 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1980); Smith
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that is required of the plaintiff is a showing that the loan or credit
instrument failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of
the statute or the regulations promulgated thereunder.3 '
The issue of compliance is measured by an objective standard.33
Allegations of substantial compliance or meaningful disclosure are
weighed objectively against the regulatory requirements.3 Strict
adherence is required and minor deviations are not excused.3 '
Neither the lender's good faith, nonliability under state law, nor
reasonableness of conduct are relevant to a determination under
the Act. 6
A finding of noncompliance with any aspect of the Act or Regulation Z may result in both criminal3 7 and civil liability. 3 The most
significant civil liability provision is section 1640,89 which permits

v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1980); Dzadovsky v. Lyons Ford Sales, Inc., 593 F.2d 538
(3d Cir. 1979); Lirtzman v. Spiegel, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Sharp v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 452 F. Supp. 465 (S.D. Ill.
1978).
32. "Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to comply..
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1974) (emphasis added). See Dzadovsky v. Lyons Ford Sales, Inc., 593
F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979); McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1978). See also 12
C.F.R. § 226.8(c)(8)(ii); Comment, PrivateRemedies Under the Truth-In-Lending Act: The
Relationship Between Rescission and Civil Liability, 57 IowA L. REv. 199 (1971).
33. Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980).
34. Id. Recently, the United States Supreme Court described meaningful disclosure:
"The concept of meaningful disclosure that animates TILA [the Truth in Lending Act]...
cannot be applied in the abstract. Meaningful disclosure does not mean more disclosure.
Rather, it describes a balance between competing considerations of complete disclosure...
and the need to avoid ... [informational overload]. Ford Motor Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S.
555, 568 (1980) (emphasis in original).
35. Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980).
36. See Drew v. Flagship First Natl Bank, 448 F. Supp. 434 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Porter v.
Household Finance Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1968). See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1635, 1640 (1968).
It is possible to seek both statutory damages under § 1640 and rescission under § 1635.
Reid v. Liberty Consumer Discount Co., 484 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Section 1635
provides for rescission to make the debtor whole, while § 1640 is a "penalty" provision
designed to compel disclosure. Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974). Although the
two remedies are not exclusive, their combined potential for harshness can be averted by
the court's exercise of discretion. Just because both are alleged, the court is still entitled to
exercise its "sense of equity" in making awards. Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862 (9th
Cir. 1974). See also Williams v. Public Finance Corp., 598 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1979); Sellers v.
Wollman, 510 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975).
39. Section 1640, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1974) provides:
§ 1640. Civil liability - Individual or class action for damages; amount of award;
factors determining amount of award
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to comply
with any requirement imposed under this part or part D or E of this subchapter
with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum
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consumers to bring an action for damages. 40 Damages under this

of

0)

-

(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure;
(2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual. action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the case of an individual action relating to a consumer lease under part E of this subchapter, 25
per centum of the total amount of monthly payments under the lease, except that the liability under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100
or greater than $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may allow, except
that as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be applicable, and the total recovery in such action shall not be more than the lesser
of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditor; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing-iability, the
costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined
by the court.
In determining the amount of award in any class action, the court shall consider,
among other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources of
the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which
the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.
Correction of error within fifteen days
(b) A creditor has no liability under this section for any failure to comply with any
requirement imposed under this part or part E of this subchapter if within fifteen
days after discovering an error, and prior to the institution of an action under this
section or the receipt of written notice of the error, the creditor notifies the person
concerned of the error and makes whatever adjustments in the appropriate account are necessary to insure that the person will not be required to pay a charge
in excess of the amount or percentage rate actually disclosed.
Unintentional violations; bona fide errors
(c) A creditor may not be held liable in any action brought under this section for a
violation of this subchapter if the creditor shows by a preponderance of evidence
that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such
error.
Liability of subsequent assignees of original creditor
(d) Any action which may be brought under this section against the original creditor in any credit transaction involving a security interest in real property may be
maintained against any subsequent assignee of the original creditor where the assignee, its subsidiaries, or affiliates were in a continuing business relationship with
the original creditor either at the time the credit was extended or at the time of
the assignment, unless the assignment was involuntary, or the assignee shows by a
preponderance of evidence that it did not have reasonable grounds to believe that
the original creditor was engaged in violations of this part, and that it maintained
procedures reasonably adapted to apprise it of the existence of any such
violations.
Jurisdiction of courts
(e) Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district
court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the
date of the occurrence of the violation.
Good faith compliance with rule, regulation, or interpretation of Board or
with interpretation or approval of duly authorized official or employee of
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section include a statutory penalty computed according to a particular finance charge,4 1 and any actual damages4 2 sustained by the
plaintiff.
The consumer, as a private attorney general, has a clear mandat
from Congress and the courts to enforce compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act. The enforcement purpose of the Act is enhanced by a relatively simple and
straightforward burden of proof. Nevertheless, certain procedural
barriers may impede the consumer's ability to ensure full compliance with the Act.

Federal Reserve System.
(f) No provision of this section or section 1611 of this title imposing any liability
shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule,
regulation, or interpretation thereof by the Board or in conformity with any interpretation or approval by an official or employee of the Federal Reserve System
duly authorized by the Board to issue such interpretations or approvals under
such procedures as the Board may prescribe therefor, notwithstanding that after
such act or omission has occurred, such rule, regulation, interpretation, or approval is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be
invalid for any reason.
Recovery for multiple failures to disclose
(g) The multiple failure to disclose to any person any information required under
this part or part D or E of this subchapter to be disclosed in connection with a
single account under an open end consumer credit plan, other single consumer
credit sale, consumer loan, consumer lease, or other extension of consumer credit,
shall entitle the person to a single recovery under this section but continued failure to disclose after a recovery has been granted shall give rise to rights to additional recoveries.
Offset from amount owed to creditor
(h) A person may not take any action to offset any amount for which a creditor is
potentially liable to such person under subsection (a)(2) of this section against any
amount owing to such creditor by such person, unless the amount of the creditor's
liability to such person has been determined by judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction in an action to which such person was a party.
40.

15 U.S.C. 1640(a) (1974).

41.

15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(2)(i) (1974).

42.

15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(1) (1974).

The Seventh Circuit has noted that the statutory damages are designed to liquidate "uncertain actual damages," as well as encourage suits to enforce the Act. Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Finance Corp., 615 F.2d 407, 415 (7th Cir. 1980). Nevertheless, it is clear that a
private litigant can pursue both the statutory remedy and a remedy for any actual damages
incurred through a § 1640 action. Actual damages, obviously, are not required for a Truth in
Lending action. Johnson v. Household Finance Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1327 (S.D. IM. 1978).
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THE PROCEDURAL DILEMMA: COUNTERCLAIMS IN TRUTH IN LENDING
LITIGATION

Federal Rule 13
The counterclaim is an integral mechanism to the federal rules'
liberal joinder policy." Counterclaims have their genesis in the

common law doctrines of set-off and recoupment." Rule 13 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure resembles former Equity Rule 30,
which required assertion of counterclaims arising out of the subject
matter of the suit. 45 Furthermore, Rule 13 incorporates the philos-

ophy of the earlier rules by discouraging circuitous actions and
multiple litigation.46
Under Rule 13, a counterclaim is characterized as either compulsory or permissive.47 A compulsory counterclaim is defined as one
which arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that creates
the subject matter of the opposing litigant's claim." An independent basis for federal jurisdiction is not required for a compulsory
counterclaim; such a claim automatically falls under the ancillary
jurisdiction of the court.4 ' If a litigant fails to assert a compulsory
counterclaim, he will be foreclosed from bringing the claim in a
subsequent independent suit.50 In contrast, a permissive counter43. Plant v. Blazer Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979). See 6 C.
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1403 (1971) [hereinafter referred

WRIGHT

to as WRIGHT & MILLER).
44. WmIr & MILER, supra note 43, at § 1402.
45. HOPKINs, FEDERAL EQUITY RuLES 209 (8th ed. 1933).
46. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43, at § 1403.

47.

FED. R. Civ. P. 13.

48. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides:

A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at
the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending
action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or
other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under
this Rule 13.
49. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc. 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974). See Valencia v. Anderson Brothers Ford, 617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980); Plant v. Blazer Financial Services, Inc. 598
F.2d 1357, 1359 (5th Cir. 1979); Bolden v. Potamkin-Auerbach Chevrolet, Inc., 470 F. Supp.
618 (E.D. Pa. 1979). This result is due to the close relationship existing between the original
cause of action and the compulsory counterclaim.
50. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43, at § 1409.
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claim5 1 cannot be entertained by the court unless it independently
meets federal jurisdictional prerequisites, 2 and where it is excluded from the federal suit, it will not be barred in later actions.53
In determining the status of a counterclaim, the federal courts
generally have applied four alternative tests to evaluate whether
claims "arise out of the same transaction or occurrence": (1)
whether the issues of law and fact are largely the same; (2) whether
the doctrine of res judicata would bar a subsequent suit without
the compulsory counterclaim rule; (3) whether the same evidence
supports both the plaintiff's and the defendant's claims; and, (4)
whether there is any logical relationship between the claim and the
counterclaim. 4 Of these four standards, the "logical relationship"
test is the most frequently applied.55 This test is favored by the
courts because it permits flexibility and realistic appraisal of individual fact situations. Moreover, it is a broad approach which circumvents multiple suits. 50
In a Truth in Lending Act proceeding, the federal counterclaim
mechanism creates significant problems which work to frustrate
the enforcement objective of the Act.5 7 The problems emanate
from the characterization of a counterclaim as compulsory or permissive. The problem is not merely a procedural one, however,
since a court's determination of the issue has a significant impact
on the availability of a federal forum for the Truth in Lending Act
plaintiff, particularly in the class action context.5 8 The most troublesome cases involve those counterclaims that flow from the loan or
credit instrument which is under attack for allegedly violating the

51. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) provides: "A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim
against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim."
52. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43, at § 1424. See Parr v. Thorp Credit, Inc. 73 F.R.D.
127, 130 (S.D. Iowa 1977).
53. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43, at § 1420.
54. For a thorough discussion of the merits and disadvantages of each test, see WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 43, at § 1410.
55. Carter v. Public Finance, Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 491 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
The Seventh Circuit has noted that "whether a particular counterclaim should be considered compulsory depends not so much on the immediacy of its connection with the plaintiff's claim as upon its logical relationship to that claim." Valencia v. Anderson Brothers
Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1291 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata National
Corp., 552 F.2d 1257, 1261-63 (7th Cir. 1977).
56. See Kissel Co. v. Farley, 417 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1969); Piatchek v. Fairview Reliable
Loan, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ill. 1979).
57. See notes 1 through 4 supra and accompanying text.
58. See text accompanying notes 99 and 105, infra.
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Act. Potential counterclaims by the lender relating to default, performance or contract validity may become issues in the litigation
concerning disclosure violations, and may operate to frustrate enforcement of the Act. The courts have split on the issue of how to
characterize the defendant-lender's counterclaim" based on varying interpretations of the federal policies underlying conterclaims
and the Truth in Lending Act. 00
The Majority Position: The Permissive Debt Counterclaim
The majority of courts have determined that debt counterclaims
are permissive.6 Accordingly, any such debt counterclaim must
have an independent jurisdictional basis before it will be entertained in federal court."' This conclusion flows from the conceptual
distinctions between the disclosure violation and the contractual
obligation.6"
The Fourth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to grapple with the problems relating to counterclaims in Truth in Lending Act litigation. In Whigham v. Beneficial Finance Company,"
the court delineated three reasons for finding the lender's debt
claim to be permissive. First, the lender's claim was governed by
state law and raised issues of law and fact that were separate and
distinct from those raised by the Truth in Lending claim. 6 Thus,
the claims did not share any of the joint characteristics required

59. See notes 61 and 78 infra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 63 and 86 infra and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980); Whigham
v. Beneficial Finance Co., 599 F.2d 1322 (4th Cir. 1979); Rounds v. Community Nat'l Bank,
454 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Ill. 1978); Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1116 (D.
Hawaii 1976); Ball v. Connecticut Bank & Trust, 404 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1975); Shriner v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 75-676 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Zeltzer v. Carte Blanche Corp., 414 F.
Supp. 1221 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Perry v. Beneficial Finance Co., 81 F.R.D. 490, 493 (W.D. N.Y.
1979); Fetta v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 77 F.R.D. 411, 414 (D.R.I. 1977); Parr v. Thorp Credit
Inc., 73 F.R.D. 127, 129 (S.D. Iowa 1977); Jones v. Sonny Gerber Auto Sales, 71 F.R.D. 695
(D. Neb. 1976); Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See also Jacklitch
v. Redstone Fed. Credit Union, 463 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (N.D. Ala. 1970) (The court's finding that the counterclaim is permissive is contrary to the subsequent Fifth Circuit holding
that deems the claim to be compulsory).
62. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
63. Basham v. Finance American Corp., 583 F.2d 918, 928 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The Truth in
Lending Act claim is not directed at or an answer to the underlying debt").
64. 599 F.2d 1322 (4th Cir. 1979).
65. Id. at 1324. As the Fourth Circuit stated: "The only question in the borrower's suit is
whether the lender made disclosures required by the federal statute and its implementing
regulations. The lender's counterclaim, on the other hand, requires the court to determine
the contractual rights of the parties in accordance with state law." Id. (citations omitted).
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for a finding that the counterclaims were in fact compulsory." Second, proof of each claim required different pieces of evidence and
would inject a myriad of unrelated concerns into the Truth in
Lending proceeding." Thus, the debt counterclaim posed potential
issues that exceeded the scope of the proof required for the Truth
in Lending claim.68 Furthermore, the court felt that the potential
for confusion and complexity was antagonistic to the congressional
intent to provide the consumer with easy access to the courts to
pursue enforcement of the Act. The straight-forward prima facie
case delineated by congress in the Act indicated an intent to permit the consumer to achieve enforcement easily. Finally, the Truth
in Lending claim and the debt claim were not considered to be
logically related,"' even though they emanated from the same
credit instrument. 70 Unlike the debt claim, the Truth in Lending
claim did not arise from the countractual obligation.7 1 Furthermore, because the debt collection claim was not of federal origin, it
was felt that it should not be used as a manipulative tactic to im7
pede Truth in Lending Act enforcement. s

66. Id. at 1323.
67. Id. at 1324. See also Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975). While
only the loan instrument will be necessary to prove the Truth in Lending claim the lender
will have to prove default. Moreover, the lender's claim can be challenged via standard contract defenses and may involve such concerns as performance, warranty, consideration and
other contract issues. Also, the proof of default may raise collateral matters concerning negotiable instruments and security interests. See, e.g., Hinkle v. Rock Springs Nat'l Bank,
538 F.2d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 73 F.R.D. 577, 579
(E.D. La. 1976).
68. Hinkle v. Rock Springs Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1976); Jones v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 73 F.R.D. 577, 579 (E.D. La. 1976).
69. Whigham v. Beneficial Finance Co., 599 F.2d 1322, 1324 (4th Cir. 1979).
70. Id. But see Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 495 (N.D. Ala. 1977)
(claims' joint origin from same credit instrument alone is sufficient to supply nexus required
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)).
71. Whigham v. Beneficial Finance Co., 599 F.2d 1322, 1324 (4th Cir. 1979). Rather, the
Truth in Lending claim flows from the Act's disclosure requirements and enforces those
requirements by invoking a statutory penalty. Id. See also Grey v. European Health Spas,
Inc., 428 F. Supp. 841, 847-48 (D. Conn. 1977).
72. Id. Courts have also recognized the distinct objectives of the two types of claims.
Even though they originate in the same instrument, the claims devolve into issues that are
fundamentally different. The Truth in Lending disclosure claim is grounded in federal law,
whereas the debt counterclaim will be governed by state law.
On a purely transactional level, such a [logical] relationship obviously exists: both
claim and counterclaim arise out of a singular occurrence . . . But in these circumstances, I do not consider the presence of transactional identity alone sufficient to establish, for compulsory counterclaim purposes, a logical relationship between plaintiff's claim and defendant's counterclaim... I find that the respective
claims are "offshoots" of the same basic transaction, but not the "same basic con-
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The Fourth Circuit's position can be supported for other reasons
as well. By holding that the debt claim is permissive, a potential
problem concerning the right to a jury can be circumvented from
the outset of the litigation. It is doubtful that a Truth in Lending
plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial. 8 In contrast, a defendant could
demand a jury trial to determine the merits of a debt counterclaim."" The plaintiff would be entitled to a separate trial to avoid
prejudice. 6 Consequently, the objective of judicial economy would
be defeated under these circumstances.
In jurisdictions which deem counterclaims to be permissive lenders often urge courts to change their position on the counterclaim
issue by raising the spectre of res judicata. Res judicata, however,
will only bar a lender's subsequent debt claim if the claim is
deemed to be compulsory.7 6 The strongest support for the majority
view is found in its appropriate solicitude for the objectives sought
to be enforced by the Truth in Lending Act. The exclusion of debt
counterclaims in the Truth in Lending Act proceeding not only
eliminates potentially cumbersome litigation, but also eliminates
the potential deterrent effect of these claims. Although debtors are
not relieved of contract liability, they do not have to battle the
issue contemporaneously with the disclosure violation. The enforcement role of the consumer-plaintiff is buttressed, and the
objectives of the Act are closer at hand." By holding the debt
counterclaim permissive, the federal policies underlying the Truth
in Lending Act are best served.

troversy between the parties
Zeltzer v. Carte Blanche Corp., 414 F. Supp. 1221, 1223 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
73. See Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 73 F.R.D. 577, 580 (E.D. La. 1976).
Actions under the Act have been considered to be sui generis and covered by the right to
jury trial at law. Id.
The equity jurisdiction of the court is invited when rescission is sought under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1635. Because the § 1635 rescission remedy may be joined with a § 1640 statutory penalty
action, it seems apparent that this is not an action at law. See note 38, supra.
74. See Plant v. Blazer Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1362 (5th Cir. 1979).
75.

See note 99 supra.

76. See Jones v. Sonny Gerber Auto Sales, 71 F.R.D. 695 (D. Neb. 1976); Agostine v.
Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
77. This is consonant with the rule that the Truth in Lending Act should be liberally
construed so as to achieve its remedial purpose. See Mirabel v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 537 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1976); Sellers v. Woolman, 510 F.2d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1975);
Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 1974).
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The Minority View: The Compulsory Debt Counterclaim
A minority of the courts 78 have determined that the lender's
debt counterclaim is compulsory within the meaning of Federal
Rule 13.7o In determining whether the counterclaims arise out of
the same "transaction or occurrence," 80 these courts have applied a
strict analysis and interpretation of Rule 13 to find that the Truth
in Lending Act claim and the debt counterclaim do in fact arise
from the same credit instrument. Thus, because of the joint origin,
the two claims are so "logically related" that any counterclaim
based on the underlying debt must be considered compulsory. 8'
This strict interpretation allegedly effectuates the liberal joinder
policy of the federal rules for three reasons. First, the two claims
will involve common issues of proof, since the Truth in Lending
action will require introduction of the loan or credit instrument. 82
Second, the counterclaim will require only minimal additional
proof of default." Finally, the compulsory counterclaim is specifi-

78. See, e.g., Plant v. Blazer Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979);
Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir. 1974) (Thompson, J., concurring); Bolden v.
Potamkin-Auerbach Chevrolet, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Engle v. Shapart
Constr. Co., 443 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D.
488 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Rollins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 71 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. La. 1976); Mims
v. Dixie Finance Corp., 426 F. Supp., 627 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Gantt v. Commonwealth Loan
Co., 416 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1978); Gibson v. Family
Finance Corp., 404 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. La. 1975); Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc.,
376 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Rodriguez v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 57 F.R.D.
189 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(2). See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
80. Id.
81. Plant v. Blazer Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1363 (5th Cir. 1979); Mims v.
Dixie Finance Corp., 426 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ga. 1976). See also George v. Beneficial Finance Co., 81 F.R.D. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488
(N.D. Ala. 1977); Rollins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 71 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. La. 1976).
82. Plant v. Blazer Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1363 (5th Cir. 1979).
83. Id. Moreover, the suits will inevitably involve the execution of the note and representations made to induce borrowing. Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 494-95
(N.D. Ala. 1977). It should be noted that even though the plaintiff's claim isgrounded in
federal law and the defendant's claim is a matter of state law, the federal courts are fully
competent to hear both claims. See note 87 infra and accompanying text.
The presence of state compulsory counterclaims in actions brought under other federal
statutes has not deterred the federal court's exercise of jurisdiction over the claims. Plant v.
Blazer Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1363 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Mayer Paving &
Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1146 (1974) (in suit against quarry for price discrimination in violation of Robinson-Patman
Act, counterclaim for foreclosure of mortgage and balance due on promissory note and open
account for unpaid stone was compulsory); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating
Co., 570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1978) (in city's antitrust action, defendant's counterclaim for the
price of power supplied was compulsory); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 56
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cally designed to provide complete relief to the defendant who is
involuntarily brought into federal court.8 ' Thus, a court's simultaneous adjudication of the debt claim with the Truth in Lending
Act claim eliminates wasteful litigation and promotes judicial
economy.8 5
Proponents of the minority view posit that not only is their approach consistent with the policy underlying the federal rules on
joinder, but also that the Truth in Lending Act supports the conclusion that the debt counterclaim should be deemed compulsory.
It is urged that because the Act was designed to afford "evenhanded treatment" to debtors and creditors,8 it should not be
used to foreclose a creditor from pursuing a claim on the credit
instrument.8 7 Unless the creditor is permitted to assert his claim in
the Lending Act adjudication, it is argued that he may be
prejudiced by a finding of a disclosure violation.8 8 Moreover, since
both state and federal courts have jurisdiction over Truth in Lending claims, ee it is argued that there is a presumption that Congress
intended the debt counterclaim to be adjudicated with the disclosure claim.9 0 A contrary analysis would always permit a plaintiff to
F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (in antitrust suit for overcharge in auto rental, counterclaim for
unpaid parking tickets, uninsured damages to cars and unpaid rental bills held compulsory).
See also Fox Chemical Co. v. Amsoil, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Minn. 1978); United States
v. Gerbus Bros. Constr. Co., 57 F.R.D. 206 (E.D. Ky. 1972). Contra Herrmann v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 72 F.R.D. 182 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (in antitrust suit, debt counterclaim held permissive); Jones v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 68 F.R.D. 60 (E.D. La. 1975)
(in action for equitable relief and damages to prevent demolition of buildings and plaintiffs'
eviction, counterclaim for back rent permissive).
84. Plant v. Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1364 (5th Cir. 1979); Revere Copper
& Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 715.
Defendant's affirmative assertion of a compulsory counterclaim will not waive his objections to personal jurisdiction or venue. In contrast, the assertion of permissive counterclaims
will waive those objections. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43, at § 1409 at 39.
85. Plant v. Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1363 (5th Cir. 1979).
86. Id. at 1364.
87. Bolden v. Potamkin-Auerbach Chevrolet, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 618, 621 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
The court in Bolden held that the plaintiffs' Truth in Lending Act claim is closely related
to a state fraudulent advertising violation, thus making the exercise of pendant jurisdiction
proper. Similarly, the court noted that the state counterclaim is "logically related." Because
the plaintiff had interjected state issues into the litigation, he should not be heard to assert
that the defendant's state claim is attenuated. Id. at 620-21.
88. Plant v. Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1364 (5th Cir. 1979).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), note 39 supra. See Vickers v. Home Federal Savings & Loan
Association, 56 A.D.2d 62, 390 N.Y.S.2d 747, 748 (1977) ("It is clear that Congress contemplated the maintenance of TIL [Truth in Lending] actions in state courts . . . [t]he . * *
language [of the Act] 'simply means that any state court which is competent under the
applicable state law could try such a case.' ").
90. Plant v. Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1364 (5th Cir. 1979) See also Stokes
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bring suit in federal court, where the debt claim is out of reach. 1
Proponents argue that Congress did not intend to insulate debtors
in federal courts from lender's counterclaims.2
Effect on the Private Litigant
Denomination of debt counterclaims as compulsory is troublesome for several reasons. First, there is an implicit assumption that
the federal court is accomplishing that which a state court would
otherwise have power to do. This implies that if the action were
filed in a state court, the debt counterclaim would always be compulsory. This is simply not true. For example, in Illinois, where
all counterclaims are permissive, "4 the debt counterclaim would not
necessarily be asserted in a suit brought in state court under the
federal statute. 95 Consequently, the filing of a Truth in Lending
action in a state court would not always compel litigation of the
debt counterclaim. 6 More fundamentally, it is questionable that
v. Twin City Motors, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
91. Plant v. Financial Services, Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1364 (5th Cir. 1979).
92. Id. Several courts have said that the courts should be wary of permitting "the Truth
In Lending Act to be used simply as a means to obtain a federal forum for ordinary debtorcreditor controversies between citizens of the same State." Hughes v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 360 F. Supp. 15, 19 (E. D. Ark. 1973). See also Price v. Franklin Investment Co., 574
F.2d 594, 607 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Solevo v. Aldens, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 861, 864 (D. Conn.
1975). Notwithstanding this caution, it is unlikely that a debtor will raise the debtor-creditor contract issues as pendant claims. Instead, the creditor will be attempting to interject
issues of default by way of counterclaims. The district court can circumvent all the contract
issues by holding that the counterclaims are permissive. See discussion infra.
93. There is no doubt the compulsory counterclaim rule is applicable ever. though the

state does not have a comparable requirement. See C.

WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL

COURTS § 79 at n.34 (3d ed. 1976) and citations contained therein. In subsequent litigation
states are not at liberty to disregard a claimant's failure to plead his compulsory counter-

claim in federal court. Id.
94.

Section 38 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act reads in pertinent part:
§ 38. Counterclaims. (1) Subject to rules, any demand by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or more codefendants, whether
in the nature of setoff, recoupment, cross demand or otherwise, and whether in
tort or contract, for liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for other relief, may be
pleaded as a cross demand in any action, and when so pleaded shall be called a
counterclaim.
95. Id.
96. Even where the state provides for compulsory counterclaims, the Truth in Lending
claim may not definitionally satisfy the test. Consequently, the contract claim and Truth in
Lending claim may not be asserted in the same state suit. At least one federal court has
refused to hold that the failure to assert the Truth in Lending claim in the contract action
estops assertion later in federal court. Drew v. Flagship First Nat'l Bank, 448 F. Supp. 434,
436-37 (M.D. Fla. 1977). Since this holding, however, the Fifth Circuit has held that the
Truth in Lending claim is compulsory under the federal rules. 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Congress ever intended these actions to be tried together. The
availability of alternative forums does not provide evidence of a
congressional intent that credit claims be tried with the federal
Truth in Lending claim. 7 Finally, congressional silence on debt
counterclaims does not represent an intent to either include or exclude these claims. Rather, it is more plausible to suggest that this
Truth in Lending
silence is attributable to a perception that the
98
contract.
the
outside
matters
with
deals
Act
97. The federal courts can exercise pendant jurisdiction over the related infractions of
the state counterpart to the Truth-in-Lending Act. The state and federal claims must be
derived from a "common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The exercise of pendant jurisdiction is discretionary. Although there is
a recognized benefit to conclusive adjudication of the state and federal claims, there is valid
concern about the burgeoning federal docket. See Ball v. Connecticut Bank and Trust Co.,
404 F. Supp. 2, 3 (1975); Soleno v. Adams, 395 F. Supp. 861 (D.C. Conn. 1975).
98. More specifically, enforcement actions brought under § 1640 are designed to provide
a civil penalty for violations of the Act. Thus, this section is not designed to make the
plaintiff whole. Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974). Thus, unlike § 1635, which
permits rescission, the substantive contract claims are not responsive to the original claim in
a § 1640 action.
15 U.S.C. § 1635 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer
credit transaction in which a security interest, including any such interest arising
by operation of law, is or will be retained or acquired in any real property which is
used or is expected to be used as the residence of the person to whom credit is
extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight
of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the
delivery of the disclosures required under this section and all other material disclosures required under this part, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in
accordance with regulations of the Board, of his intention to do so. The creditor
shall clearly and conspicuously disclose, in accordance with regulations of the
Board, to any obligor in a transaction subject to this section the rights of the
obligor under this section. The creditor shall also provide, in accordance with regulations of the Board, an adequate opportunity to the obligor to exercise his right
to rescind any transaction subject to this section.
(b) When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a) of this
section, he is not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest
given by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a rescission. Within ten days after receipt of a notice of
rescission, the creditor shall return to the obligor any money or property given as
earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or
appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the
transaction. If the creditor has delivered any property to the obligor, the obligor
may retain possession of it. Upon the performance of the creditor's obligation
under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the creditor, except
that if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or inequitable, the
obligor shall tender its reasonable value. Tender shall be made at the location of
the property or at the residence of the obligor, at the option of the obligor. If the
creditor does not take possession of the property within ten days after tender by
the obligor, ownership of the property vests in the obligor without obligation on
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Even though the counterclaim issue is technically a matter of
procedure, resolution of the issue has a significant impact on the
availability of a federal forum for Truth in Lending violations, 9"

Thus, the counterclaim issue has substantive implications as well.
The potential involvement of compulsory contract claims may have
a chilling effect upon the private plaintiff's decision to bring
suit. 0 0 Because these actions concern consumer transactions it is
possible that the aggrieved consumer is delinquent in his obligations. Ironically, the reason for a potential plaintiff's delinquency
may in fact be the deceptive credit practices of the creditor. The

potential default recovery could, however, exceed the Truth in
Lending Act award.' Consequently, the consumer may be reluctant to bring suit for a statutory recovery when the end result
might be a more substantial judgment being entered on the default.10 2 Thus, the incentive to bring an enforcement suit under the
Act is defused.
There is no dispute that the Act is not designed to circumvent or
vindicate a borrower's debt liability. 0 3 The problem is, however,
that the private attorney general mechanism fails if the plaintiff is
reluctant to bring a disclosure action. Although section 1640 is not
designed to create a windfall for the plaintiff,' 0" the mechanism
probably cannot succeed if the consumer-plaintiff risks both the

his part to pay for it.
99. Conceivably, a middle course of action is possible. If a counterclaim can be shown to
prejudice the opposing party, the court could order separate trials under Federal Rules 13(i)
and 42(b). Separate judgments under Federal Rule 54(b) could be entered. This does very
little, however, to alleviate the confusion presented by compulsory counterclaims. In fact, it
would only further open the court's door to litigation of state claims that lack an independent jurisdictional basis.
100. Mims v. Dixie Finance Corp., 426 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Rollins v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 71 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. La. 1976).
101. See, e.g., Engle v. Shapert Const. Co., 443 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
This is a particularly difficult problem in class actions, where class members' maximum
recovery may only be a few dollars. Id. In Carter,the court acknowledged that the presence
of counterclaims exposed class members to greater liability than the statutory award. Nevertheless, the court found the counterclaims compulsory and noted that the class members
would probably never bring suit individually because of the potential contract liability.
Thus, they should not be permitted to circumvent the contract liability in a class action.
102. Id. See also Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 491 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
103. Basham v. Finance America Corp., 583 F.2d 918, 928 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The design
of the Truth in Lending Act was to provide protection to consumers by affording them
meaningful disclosure and thereby an opportunity to shop for credit. It was not designed,
nor should it be used to thwart the valid claims of creditors").
104. See generally Sellers v. Woilman, 510 F.2d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1975).
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entry of a judgment for default and the set-off of any statutory
award.
Class Action Implications
The resolution of the counterclaim issue has the most significant
impact in the context of the class action. Although the Act permits
class recovery, the decision to certify a class action is committed to
the court's discretion. 105 In accordance with Rule 23,106 the federal
court must make findings concerning numerosity of the class, commonality of issues, typicality of claims and adequacy of the class
representatives.10 7 Additionally, the court must determine whether
the class action is a superior method of adjudication by determining whether common issues of law or fact predominate over individual issues.' 0 8 In making this determination, four considerations
must be weighed by the court: (1) the possible interest of individual control; (2) existing individual litigation; (3) the effects of concentrating the litigation and, (4) class management and administration.0 9 In addition to these pragmatic considerations, the court
must also be mindful of the scope and purpose of the underlying
Truth in Lending legislation. 110 Where courts have characterized
debt claims as compulsory counterclaims, the presence of those
105. Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc. 618 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1980); see also Jacklitch v.
Redstone Federal Credit Union, 463 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D. Ala. 1979); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
106. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: . . .(3) the court
finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate action; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
107. Id.
108. Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 492-93 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
109. Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 1980).
110. Id.
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claims in the lawsuit has been fatal to class certification."'
The debt counterclaim often is viewed as antagonistic to the underlying objectives of class actions. For example, it may be found
that where there are creditor counterclaims, the class proceedings
will degenerate into a collection of minitrials, where individual
contract claims and defenses dominate.1 1 2 Thus, the basic class certification requirement that issues of law and fact predominate will
not be met. Additionally, it has been urged that if any representative party is in default, the claims and defenses of that party will
not typify the claims and defenses of the class. " In fact, although
motives for bringing a class suit under the Act are generally not
questioned,"' concern has been voiced about the motives of a
11
debtor in default who initiates a class action. 5
111. See Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 492 (N.D. Ala. 1977). ("The
majority of Truth in Lending cases considering the issue . . . have determined that the
presence of such counterclaims renders, or may render, the class action inferior to other
methods of adjudication.")
One court has indicated that findings of compulsory counterclaims are no more than a
facade. "It may be suspected that district court opinions to the contrary were mere shibboleths upon which to rest a determination that a class action was not to be maintained because of difficulties likely to be encountered in its management." Jacklitch v. Redstone Federal Credit Union, 463 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 n.1 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
112. Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 490 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
113. Whether a party adequately represents the remainder of the class is ordinarily a
question of fact which must be decided in accordance with the facts of each case. Sussman
v. Lincoln American Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90 (7th Cir. 1977); Lirtzman v. Spiegel, Inc., 493 F.
Supp. 1029, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
114. Sarafin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 73 F.R.D. 585 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
115. See, e.g., Stranger v. American Buyers Club, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 790, 793 (S.D. I11.
1978).
In support of their motions, the defendants have filed certain affidavits which
state that the gross potential class is in excess of 1,000 persons, that this plaintiff
had defaulted upon her contract, and that approximately 80 persons from the total class are in default. It thus appears that this plaintiff's interests would parallel
those of only a nominal percentage of the class as a whole, namely, those persons
Who are, like herself, in default. It is obvious that the claims and defenses of this
plaintiff are not typical of those of the alleged class as a whole.
A question of motivation must also bear upon this issue. Affidavits and documentary evidence submitted with the motions would indicate that the 1% of net
worth limit imposed by the Act upon class recovery would reduce the prorata recovery of each class member to a sum of $7.00 to $8.00. Thus, this plaintiff, by
adopting the class action format, has elected to waive, not only herself, but, potentially, for each member of the class, 92% to 93% of the statutory minimum penalty to which each is entitled under the Act. It would be improper to speculate
upon this plaintiff's motivation in electing the class action format of suit. Yet it
would be more grossly improper to certify this plaintiff as a representative of the
whole class. It is necessary to note the possibility that the class action device may
have been adopted by this plaintiff as a lever which, hopefully, might alleviate her
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Moreover, because individual statutory recovery usually exceeds
the potential recovery available in a class action, 1" 6 there is some
authority that the class mechanism is not superior to individual
adjudications." 7 This conclusion is faulty for two reasons. First, it
expressly ignores the clear congressional intent that class actions
be used as a potent enforcement tool whenever possible."" Second,
it assumes that the class members would individually bring suit if
the class were not certified." 9 This assumption imputes a greater
level of awareness and sophistication to consumers than probably
exists. 10 Further, it defeats the class action objective of encouraging an action to be brought on behalf of a large number of people
who would not bring suit on their own initiative.' 2 '
Lender counterclaims may present significant administrative
problems for an effective class action. 22 The nature of the expanded case and issues presented obviously threatens judicial efficiency. Also, many potential class members may wish to opt out
because of the counterclaims. Consequently, the resulting res

own situation.
Id.
116. Section 1640(a)(2) does not clearly state that a class representative bringing suit
waives his right to an individual recovery. If a right to an individual recovery exists, there is
arguably an "inherent conflict" between the plaintiff and other members of the class because the plaintiff stands to recover a much larger award. Perry v. Beneficial Finance Co., 81
F.R.D. 490, 495-96 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). In response to this argument, it has been held that
plaintiff waives any right to an individual recovery by bringing a class action. Goldman v.
First Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Perry v. Beneficial Finance Co., 81 F.R.D. 490, 496 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Bantolina v. Aloha Motors,
Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Hawaii 1976). If this right is waived, then the representative
plaintiff's interests are coextensive with the remainder of the class. See Perry v. Beneficial
Finance Co., 81 F.R.D. 490, 496 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
117. Carter v. Public Financing Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 495 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
118. See generally Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1980);
Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976).
119. Ironically, the court in Carter noted:
These class members would probably find themselves exposed to much greater
liability on the counterclaim than they would ever stand to recover from the defendant in the class action, and probably would never choose to bring individual
actions. For this reason the court does not believe a class action is in interest of
the class members, who would probably be better off by individually controlling
their suits.
73 F.R.D. at 491. Since the court admits they would not likely bring individual suits, it is
difficult to perceive the putative benefit of denying class certification to permit them to
control the suits they will never bring.
120. Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 404 (6th Cir. 1980).
121. See Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 491 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
122. Id. at 493. See also Alpert v. United States Industry, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 491 (C.D. Cal.
1973).
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judicata effect of the primary action requires that notice be given
to these individual class members.123 Moreover, defaulting class
members might not appreciate the risk of entry of a judgment
2 4 Thus,
which could exceed any potential recovery against them."
unless the notice is explicit, the class members will be bound by
both the small Truth in Lending award as well as the contract
adjudication. 2 "
Similarly, defaulting class members who are cognizant of the potential risks involved where a counterclaim is deemed compulsory
may also seek to opt out. As a result, significant numbers of the
class who have legitimate claims will be excluded,' 2 6 and the superiority of the class mechanism thereby defeated. There is great
irony in this result. The same courts that consider the policies of
the compulsory counterclaim to be paramount to the policies of
the Truth in Lending Act, circuitously hold that the true policies
of the Act cannot be served when compulsory counterclaims force
members out of the class. 2 ' It is even more ironic that the liberal
joinder policy which underlies the counterclaim analysis is a basis
for denial of class certification. Despite explicit congressional intent to encourage use of the class action device in Truth in Lending disclosure actions, the liberal joinder policy requiring the court
to bring in several debt counterclaims supersedes this congressional mandate for joinder of consumers with identical Truth in
Lending Act claims.
Some courts have tried to soften the harsh result wrought by the
existence of compulsory counterclaims in class actions.' 28 One ap123. In addition, one court notes that the contracts may require the debtor to pay court
costs and attorney's fees. Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 491 (N.D. Ala.
1977). Thus, the judgment entered on the contract would exceed the statutory award. Moreover, despite the provision for attorney's fees under the Act, the debtor might be assessed at
least a proportionate share of the fees.
124. Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 491 (N.D. Ala. 1977). See generally
Alpert v. United States Industry, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 491 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
125. Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488, 493 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
126. Id.
127. The court in George noted that '[c]oncededly, adherence to the literal command of
Rule 13(a) here cuts against achievement of "efficiency" by defeating a class adjudication of
other common issues.' 81 F.R.D. at 6. Nevertheless, the court found the mandate of Rule
13(a) more compelling and held the counterclaims were compulsory. Id.
128. In addition to the approaches delineated in the text, two other solutions have been
used. One court has held that "unnamed" class members are not opposing" parties within
the meaning of Rule 13. Thus, despite the compulsory character of the claims, the parties
are not opposing. Assertion of the claim therefore would not be mandated by the rule. See
Donson Stores, Inc., v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). One
other court has simply held that the presence of compulsory counterclaims is an insufficient
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proach is to treat potential counterclaims as claims which affect
only the remedy to be awarded, not the underlying liability.1 29
Thus, the question of whether a specific class member will be
awarded damages is determined by the validity of outstanding
debt counterclaims. 3 0 Even though the remedies among class
members might vary under this approach, common issues of law
and fact would still predominate in the determination of liability.13 1 This analysis results in a bifurcated proceeding, involving a
general liability stage and a separate remedy stage to ascertain individual relief. This approach has been criticized as only circumventing, rather than confronting, the confusion caused by compul3 2
sory counterclaims.1
A second technique that has been used to tone down the harsh
result in class actions is to exclude defaulting members of the class,
or create a subclass. This approach operates on the theory that
half a class is better than no class at all."3 3 Where a class involves
only a few defaulting members, the potency of the enforcement action is not lost. If, however, a significant segment of the class is in
default and is excluded, the litigation will be deflated. 34 Moreover,
compulsory counterclaims could still be asserted against individual
class members and thereby be a basis for denial of class certification 3 5 on the ground of lack of commonality. 3 e

basis to decertify the class. Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 56 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
129. See Weit v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 5 (N.D. Ill.
1973); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp. 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
130. See Weit v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 5 (N.D. Ill.
1973); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
131. Id.
132. George v. Beneficial Finance Co., 81 F.R.D. 4, 7 (N.D. Tex. 1977) ("Nothing is
gained from allowing the suit to proceed as a class action knowing full well that the 'damage
phase' of the case would be totally unmanageable.")
133. See George v. Beneficial Finance Co., 81 F.R.D. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
134. George v. Beneficial Finance Co., 81 F.R.D. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1977). The court points
out that the congressional objective is disclosure. Compliance is achieved by the class action
mechanism which joins a large number of people together to enforce the Act. If a significant
portion of a potential class is excluded, the potency of the class action device obviously is
lost. Id. at 7.
Additionally, it should be noted that the time for "default" poses additional management
problems. Class members may be defaulting and curing default at varying times. Even if the
time for default is fixed, members who default or cure default after that date will be improperly excluded from or included in the class. Id. Moreover, if the class representative is
in default, the continued viability of the action is dependent upon the initiative of other
class members. Similarly, subclassing presents significant problems, since commonality of
issues is still required.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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The characterization of a debt counterclaim as compulsory may
be the death knell for many class action suits. The counterclaim
issue thus strikes at the very heart of the decision to certify a class
action. Consequently, the consumer-plaintiff may lose one of the
most potent enforcement tools for ensuring compliance with the
Truth in Lending Act.
Further Implications of the Counterclaim Issue: The Illinois
Position
The importance of uniformity in the federal forum in characterizing creditor claims in Truth in Lending Act enforcement proceedings is further demonstrated by the potential conflict which
exists between the Seventh Circuit and Illinois state courts. The
Seventh Circuit has endorsed the majority position on creditor
contract claims, deeming them to be permissive counterclaims. The
court has therefore recognized the complete independence of the
Truth in Lending disclosure suit from the underlying contract action. There is some authority in the state courts, however, that a
Truth in Lending Act violation could be a complete defense to a
creditor contract claim. The effect of this position is to leave the
creditor without a remedy.
The Seventh Circuit adopted the permissive counterclaim position in Valencia v. Anderson Brothers Ford.37 The court reviewed
the positions taken by the Fifth and Fourth Circuits on the issue
of counterclaims in the Truth in Lending context. Cognizant of
previous holdings that the immediacy of the connection between
claims does not automatically satisfy the "logical relationship"
test, the court noted that the "sole connection" between the Truth
in Lending Act claim and the contract claims was the initial execution of the loan instrument.13 8 The court noted that requiring a
joint trial of claims emanating from this instrument would not
achieve the advantages sought by the compulsory counterclaim
rule. 13 9 Thus, adopting the Fourth Circuit's analysis, the court declined to hold the debt counterclaims compulsory. Instead, it
found that the enforcement objectives of the Truth in Lending Act
were better served by denominating these claims permissive.4 0
The debt counterclaim will rarely, if ever, satisfy independent

137.
138.
139.
140.

617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1291.
See notes 82 through 85 supra.
Valencia v. Anderson Brothers Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1290-91 (7th Cir. 1980).

1981]

Truth in Lending Act

jurisdictional grounds. Therefore the effect of the court's characterization of the claim as permissive is that the lender's remedy
will be in the state forum. It is critical to the lender that the state
court recognize the limited and independent nature of the Truth in
Lending proceeding and not permit that action to have any effect
on the debt action. Prior to the Seventh Circuit's pronouncement
in Valencia, however, one Illinois appellate court suggested that a
Truth in Lending disclosure violation could be treated as a com" ' The
plete defense to a subsequent contract suit by the lender.14
court noted that Illinois has long recognized the rule that a valid
defense to contract enforcement exists where the contract is illegal
under federal or Illinois law.' 4 Since it is not necessary that the
relevant federal statute declare the contract void or unenforceable,
the illegality defense could be based on a statutory violation. Thus,
the court concluded that violations of the Truth in Lending Act or
Regulation Z are 4 grounds
for asserting the defense of illegality in
3
the lender's suit.

The recognition of a contract defense for violations of the Truth
in Lending Act creates a real quandary for the lender. For example, if an Illinois borrower, or class of borrowers, sues an Illinois
lender in federal court, the lender's counterclaim will be deemed
permissive. Consequently, the lender will be expected to bring his
debt claims in state court. When the lender brings suit in state
court, the Illinois borrower can assert that violations of the Truth
in Lending Act rendered the contract illegal and hence unenforce141. American Buyers Club v. Grayling, 53 I11.
App. 3d 611, 613, 368 N.E.2d 1057, 1059
(1977).
142. Id.
143. It is unclear whether Grayling extended the defense to statutory violations of federal or state law. 53 Ill. App. 3d at 613, 368 N.E.2d at 1059. In American Buyers Club v.
Zuber, 57 Ill. App. 3d 899, 373 N.E.2d 786 (1978), the court noted that "[ilt
[is] unnecessary
for us to consider whether violations of the [Illinois] act preclude enforcement of a contract
although we can find no authority .. " 57 I11.
App. 3d at 904, 373 N.E.2d at 790. The
Zuber court also noted that a federal statutory violation would render the contract void. Id.
at 903, 373 N.E.2d at 790.
In Piatcheck v. Fairview Reliable Loan, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ill.
1970), this issue
was further confused. There, the federal district court read Zuber as having concluded that
Truth in Lending violations would not render an underlying contract unenforceable. 474 F.
Supp. at 626. This reading of Zuber is inaccurate, because the Zuber decision directly addressed only the violations of the Illinois statute. Ironically, while the district court in
Piatcheck stated that Grayling should be limited to its facts, it did not hesitate to rely upon
Grayling. The court relied upon Grayling to support the proposition that because Truth in
Lending claims can serve as a defense in a state contract action, they arise from the same
transaction as debt claims on the underlying contract. Therefore, the court found that the
latter, when asserted as counterclaims in federal court, should be considered compulsory.
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able. The Supreme Court of Illinois has not passed upon this legal
catch 22.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, however, has considered
the defensive assertion of the Truth in Lending claim. In Household Consumer Discount Co. v. Vespagiani,1" the defendant asserted that the defense of recoupment should be an available
means of asserting his Truth in Lending claim. If allowed to do so,
any statutory penalty awarded the defendant debtor would diminish the lender's contract recovery. The court unequivocally stated
that the Truth in Lending claim can never provide a defense to an
45
action on the debt.
The Pennsylvania position reflects an enlightened view. The
Truth in Lending Act was not designed to reach substantive contract issues.'16 Just as those issues are inappropriate in the counterclaim analysis, they are also an inappropriate basis for a contract defense. The Act expressly states that except in narrow
circumstances it does not affect the validity or enforceability of
any contract under state or federal law. Further, civil penalties
outlined in section 1640 are not designed to give a borrower the
benefit of his bargain. These statutory damage provisions bear no
relationship to any theory of contractual recovery. The Act's purpose, to ensure full and fair credit disclosure, therefore should not
be subverted by permitting substantive contract matters to be
raised.
CONCLUSION

The Truth in Lending Act was enacted as a prophylactic measure to secure full and fair credit disclosure. Through standardized
credit terms, the consumer is able to make informed credit decisions. The purposes of the Act are achieved through various enforcement mechanisms, the most important of which is the con144. 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 351, 387 A.2d 93 (1978).
145. Id. at 356, 387 A.2d at 97.
146. Analogously, a creditor cannot "offset" debts which have been reduced to judgment
in state court. Although § 1640(h) provides that no offset may be obtained unless a court of
competent jurisdiction has entered judgment on the debt, this reference is to creditors'
debts. See note 39 supra. The purpose of this provision was to require that a debtor reduce
a lender's liability to judgment under the Act before offsetting against the balance owed
under the loan contract. Stephens v. Household Finance Corp., 566 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Old.
1977) ("A debtor attempts to evade payment on a note by deducting the Act's penalty from
his payment without a judicial determination of the liability of the lender."). See Reid v.
Liberty Consumer Discount Co., 484 F. Supp. 435, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1980). See also Jones v.
Sonny Gerber Auto Sales, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 695 (D. Neb. 1976).
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sumer as "private attorney general." In this capacity, either as a
class or as individuals, the credit industry is policed and compliance with the Act is encouraged.
The purposes of the Act should not be distorted by procedural
mechanisms which dilute the private enforcement mechanism.
Suits arising under the Act have no logical relationship to lenders'
potential contract counterclaims. Consequently, individual and
class actions should not be summarily defeated in federal court by
counterclaims involving contract issues. The majority of courts
have recognized the important function of private enforcement actions, and the separability of disclosure violations from contract
issues. Thus, the majority rule excludes these state contract issues
from Truth in Lending actions filed in federal court. A minority of
courts persist in characterizing these counterclaims as compulsory.
Because this defeats many Truth in Lending disclosure actions,
neither the liberal joinder policies of the federal rules nor the policies of the Act are served.
The Seventh Circuit has recognized the complete independence
of the Truth in Lending disclosure suit from underlying contract
claims. It is apparent, however, that the Illinois appellate courts
have not drawn the same distinction. The erection of a contract
defense in state court equally subverts the underlying purpose of
the Truth in Lending Act. Moreover, it can effectively deny the
lender a forum for his contract or debt claim. At the earliest opportunity the Illinois courts should join their federal counterparts
and correct this situation.

